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Abstract
This paper examines issues related to the economic impact of sports championships on
the local economy of host cities. While boosters frequently claim a large positive effect of such
championships, a closer examination leads to the conclusion that the impact is likely much
smaller than touted and may even be negative.
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INTRODUCTION
Economics has frequently been used as a rationale in defense of public subsidies for
professional sports. Subsidy advocates argue that new teams and/or stadiums provide an
economic stimulus, and public support for professional sports should be construed as an
investment rather than expenditure. This proposition is thought to be particularly true when the
public subventions for sport produce championship teams. Two issues need to be analyzed in
conjunction with this thesis. First, do greater subsidies translate into more frequent
championships? Second, do sports championships correspond to higher levels of economic
activity? The purpose of this report is to provide answers to these questions.
A direct correlation between subsidies and championships has theoretical appeal. In this
era of free agency, compelling evidence exists to support the thesis. Teams that finish high in
the financial standings have the resources to compete for the players that have the capacity to
win. For example, using statistics provided by Major League Baseball (MLB) for the 2001
season, eleven of the fourteen teams with losing records correspond to those teams in the bottom
half of stadium revenues (MLB, 2001). An equally convincing case can be made for the second
thesis on several levels. Post-season games mean more spending not only because there are
more contests, but also heightened fan interest very likely translates into additional expenditures.
Furthermore, if people feel better as a consequence of their team’s success, it is arguable that
they are more productive.
The pursuit of championships comes at some costs, however, some of which are not
obvious. In particular the following should be noted:
(1) Building a new stadium provides a team with a financial advantage only if other
teams are not adopting the same strategy.

(2) The additional revenues must be spent on players to enable the team to become more
competitive on the field.
(3) During the construction phase of a stadium project, the costs associated with
economic dislocation due to construction may exceed the benefits associated with the
expenditure. The closer the economy is to full employment prior to the project, the more likely
this is to be the case.
(4) Sport is a diversion, and the additional games may capture the attention of workers to
the point where economic activity falters rather than accelerates as a consequence of post-season
play. Just as success in the playoffs may contribute positively to worker morale and
productivity, a lack of success may have the opposite effect. In fact, only the city hosting the
champion can claim a warm, fuzzy feeling for their fans.
(5) Celebrations, both formal and informal, are held in the host city to honor the
championship team. The increasingly intense and destructive informal celebrations are costly.
(6) What does a championship mean to the fans? The evidence suggests that they pay for
the championship before and after. Basking in the glow of the team’s success does come at
some expense.
The paper is organized in accordance with these six points.

FALLACY OF COMPOSITION
It is well known that the behavior or actions of an individual economic actor produce
different than the same behavior for a group of economic actors. One person standing at a
football game does not alter viewing much for the fans in the row behind, but if an entire row
decides to stand, it compels a reaction from the row behind. The fallacy of composition has

application for issues relating to stadium construction and the pursuit of professional sports
championships. Simply put, if a team is not competitive financially, then it cannot bid for the
free-agent talent essential for being competitive on the field. The construction of a new stadium,
while a necessary condition for athletic success, is not sufficient. The new venue confers a
sustainable financial advantage to the team only if other teams do not adopt the same strategy.
This is true for those professional sports teams that belong to leagues that have the most
comprehensive revenue sharing programs, the National Football League (NFL), and it is also
true for MLB, the league that arguably has least extensive revenue sharing arrangement. In
Table 1 information has been recorded relating to the effect a new stadium has had on the
competitiveness of teams.
The information indicates that shortly after the teams built new stadiums they became
playoff contenders. The connection between new stadiums and team success is clear and is
attributable to increased team payrolls (as the information in Table 2 indicates.) Following the
open of the SkyDome in Toronto in 1989 the Blue Jays won World Series in 1992 and 1993 with
baseball’s largest payroll. Baltimore, near the bottom of league payrolls in 1992, had the second
largest team payroll by 1995 following the opening of Camden Yards in 1992. Finally,
Cleveland probably presents the greatest success story of stadium construction leading to onfield success. The Cleveland Indians, with one of baseball’s three lowest payrolls in 1992 and
1993 and a 50-year record of post-season futility, turned around their franchise after the
construction of Jacobs Field in 1994. The Indians were among the top three franchises in payroll
in 1996 and 1997 and made World Series appearances in 1995 and 1997. In fact, on-field success
following the opening was the rule, not the exception, during the early period of MLB’s recent
stadium construction boom. Of the 12 teams building new stadiums between 1989 and 2000, 11

made playoff appearances within 2 years of the construction of the stadium. Only Tampa Bay, a
1998 expansion franchise, and Baltimore, whose potential playoff appearance was postponed by
a year due to the 1994 MLB players’ strike, defied the pattern.
As more and more of baseball’s infrastructure has been replaced in the last decade,
however, it has become increasingly difficult for a new stadium to confer a competitive edge.
With 17 teams playing in facilities constructed or significantly renovated since 1989, and another
8 teams with plans for new stadiums, it is clear that not every team with a new stadium can
support an above average payroll and the above average on-field performance that accompanies
a large payroll. Since MLB allows for only eight teams to participate in the postseason, it is
simply impossible for every team with a new stadium to qualify for the playoffs. It is likely that
the early on-field success that accompanied teams such as the Blue Jays, Indians, Orioles, and
Rangers, who built new stadiums in the early stages of the building boom, will not necessarily
accrue to the most recent builders.
The evidence indicates that in the early years of this construction cycle, stadiums
conferred an edge, which dissipated in part as a consequence of newer stadiums coming into
existence. Winning in professional sports is by definition a zero-sum game, and the competitive
advantage conferred by new stadiums is diluted by new ballparks. The experience of the teams
in the most recently constructed stadiums demonstrates this pattern. Why?

NEW STADIUM REVENUES AND PAYROLLS: THE RECENT EXPERIENCE
In the earlier stages of the stadium construction boom, new stadium revenues translated
into higher player salaries and a postseason experience. The Milwaukee Brewers, Detroit Tigers,
and Pittsburgh Pirates, who have yet to make the post-season since the construction of their

stadiums and appear unlikely to make the playoffs any time in the near future, broke the pattern
through not using new stadium revenues to acquire the free agents that would make them
competitive. The information recorded in Table 2 confirms the break with the past.
The information recorded in Table 2 indicates that with few exceptions team payrolls
increased rather substantially after a new stadium is built and sustained for several years
following the inaugural season. The exceptions are for the stadiums built since 2000 in Detroit,
Milwaukee, and Pittsburgh where payroll increases at the time those stadiums began operating
were not maintained in subsequent seasons. The lesson is that a new stadium is not sufficient to
produce a play-off caliber team. The incremental revenue generated by a new stadium does
provide the potential for a more competitive team, but it is necessary that the money be used for
payroll. For teams that do not use the money in this way, they risk alienating their fans thereby
reducing the revenue enhancing novelty effect associated with new venues. Falling attendance
in Milwaukee, Detroit, and Pittsburgh the year after the inaugural season for their new ballparks
supports this proposition. An opportunity may have well been lost for all these cities at least
until the next round of new stadium construction. The continual appearance of new facilities also
makes it difficult for existing teams with newer stadiums to sustain their success.

INDIRECT STADIUM CONSTRUCTION COSTS
It is widely believed that cities benefit from the construction of a stadium. Money is
spent and resources are employed during the construction phase of the project. Theoretically the
extent to which the city benefits during construction depends on several things. First, the public
money spent must not only generate benefit in a gross sense, but the benefit net of those benefits
derived from the next best alternative use of those funds must be positive. In other words the

project must represent the most efficacious use of money devoted to it. Second, the project must
utilize resources that reside in the metropolitan area. To the extent that construction resources
reside elsewhere, there may be a transfer of income from the city when resources repatriate their
earnings to their primary residences. Firms that specialize in stadium construction exhibit a
national or even international character given the specialized nature of the industry. For
example, only one of the four firms involved in the construction of Miller Park in Milwaukee
was headquartered in Milwaukee. The four firms included: Huber, Hunt & Nichols Inc.
(Indianapolis), Clark Construction (Chicago), Hunzinger Construction (Milwaukee), and
Mitsubishi Heavy Industries of America. Third, the amount of slack in the local economy will
determine the extent to which the value created through construction is local in character. The
closer the local economy is to full employment, the more likely resources used will be non-local.
Furthermore, large construction projects disrupt local economies. Traffic is diverted, and
commercial interests within the construction zone suffer. Evidence from the City of Los Angeles
during the construction phase of the Staples Center supports the contention that the net economic
of a sports facility during the construction phase may be negative.

POST SEASON BENEFITS?
During championship runs, league officials and team boosters are quick to publish
official sounding claims of the economic benefits that a city derives from hosting these sporting
mega-events. The NFL typically claims an economic impact from the Super Bowl in the
neighborhood of $300 to $400 million. Estimates from hosting a World Series and the preceding
playoffs games range as high as $250 million with predictions for the impact of the NBA and
NHL finals generally coming in somewhat lower.

Numerous scholars have attempted to estimate the impact of large sporting events and
league championships on host cities. Baade and Matheson (2001) use employment and taxable
sales data to find the effect of MLB's All-Star Game metropolitan areas. Porter (1999) uses
taxable sales data determine the implications of hosting the Super Bowl for host cities. Baade
and Matheson (2003a, 2003b) use metropolitan area personal income data to estimate the
impacts of MLB's post-season and the Super Bowl on local economies. In all cases, the
economic consequences of hosting these mega-events are statistically insignificant and,
generally speaking about a tenth the size of the figures quoted by league and team boosters. The
prevailing opinion among economists is that while these sporting events may be large in a gross
sense, because of crowding out, leakages, and substitution effects, the net influence on the host
city is small.
The one exception to this is rule is Coates and Humphreys (2002). Their examination of
post-season play in the NFL, NBA, and MLB, similar to all of the previous studies, finds that the
cities hosting post-season play experience no significant increase in real per capita personal
income. In a very surprising discovery, however, they found that over the time period of their
sample, 1969-1997, the city winning the Super Bowl experienced a statistically significant
increase of roughly $140 in per capita income.
This result is particularly surprising considering that the Super Bowl, unlike the
championships in the other major professional sports, hockey, basketball, and baseball, is held at
a pre-determined neutral site rather than at one of the participants' home fields. Therefore, while
one might predict that the economies in the cities of the other sports' champions will be
influenced by the economic activity surrounding the actual game(s), in the case of the Super
Bowl, the winner's home town receives no direct revenue from the team's big victory since the

win will likely take place thousands of miles away. In fact, no Super Bowl champion has ever
won the big game in their own home stadium. Furthermore, because of the NFL's single-game
elimination playoff system, it is quite possible that the winning team may never have played
even a single post-season game at home.
A positive correlation between a championship and economic activity has some
theoretical appeal, which most likely has a psychological basis. As argued by Coates and
Humphreys, if people in a community bask in the reflected glory of their team, that positive
feeling could translate into greater productivity in the workplace. It is debatable, of course, how
pervasive that feeling is and how long it endures. In fact, a further examination of victorious
Super Bowl cities conducted by Matheson (2003) concluded that the economic impact from
winning the Super Bowl was approximately one-third that estimated by Coates and Humphreys,
and it was not statistically significant. The collective evidence, therefore, would offer only tepid
support for the thesis that winning any championship in a professional sport boosts a
metropolitan economy.

CELEBRATING CHAMPIONSHIPS
On the other hand, in today’s social climate there is reason to believe that a sports
championship could exert a negative effect on the host city’s economy. Both informal and
formal celebrations occur following championships. English football no longer holds a
monopoly on sports-related violence, and the informal celebrations all too frequently degenerate
into riots resulting in violence and the destruction of property, which will likely negatively affect
productive activity in the short-run. While violent celebrations first received widespread
publicity following the NBA title won by the Detroit Pistons in the late 1980s, nowadays no

sport seems to be immune from hooliganism as witnessed by the widespread arrests following
the loss of the Purdue University women’s basketball team in the 2001 title game. Even orderly,
well-organized formal celebrations may result in economic losses. Tickertape parades often
result in business closings along parade routes for the day, and, if enough people participate
could eliminate part or all of a workday for a substantial number of workers.
In using the same model discussed earlier to identify the economic impact of the Staples
Center on the City of Los Angeles economy during the construction phase of the project, it was
discovered that economic activity during the championship runs for the NBA Los Angeles
Lakers during the 2000 and 2001 NBA seasons correlated negatively with City of Los Angeles
taxable sales. For the second quarter, the operation of Staples Center correlated negatively with
economic activity in the City of Los Angeles. It is possible that during the Lakers championship
runs, people in sufficient numbers preferred to watch the games at home and spent less money as
a consequence. Testing this hypothesis is beyond the scope of this work, but it could be that
winning a championship does have an economic cost other than the damage that unfortunately
accompanies impromptu championship celebrations. It should be noted, however, that the
official celebration in Los Angeles closed Figueroa Street, a major commercial corridor,
following Lakers championships in 2000, 2001, and 2002. It would not be implausible that oneday of lost economic activity would translate into tens of millions of dollars of reduced taxable
sales given the size of the Los Angeles economy. Then too, people who ordinarily patronize
businesses in the City would avoid doing so during the chaos and congestion that generally
characterizes championship celebrations in sport.

CHAMPIONSHIPS, THE GIFT THAT KEEPS ON TAKING

Evidence indicates that fans get burned basking in the warm glow of a team’s success. In
the parlance of economists, teams extract a portion of fan consumer surplus following a
championship run. Consider the evidence from the NFL and MLB. Between 1983 and 2000, the
average ticket price for all NFL teams increased by 6.40 percent per year, while the ticket price
for teams having won the Super Bowl the previous year averaged 12.0 percent during that same
period of time. Over the period 1992 through 2002, the average MLB ticket price rose 6.97
percent, while ticket prices for the World Series champions rose 10.02 percent over that same
time period.

CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
Teams and leagues have used various arguments to enlist public financial support in the
construction of professional sports facilities. One argument has focused on the fact that in this
era of player free agency, sports championships are won as much on the income statement as the
playing field. If teams are burdened with debt accumulated through privately financing stadium
construction when the teams with whom they compete are not, then championships will not
materialize. Public subsidy advocates argue that championships not only bring fame but fortune
to the host city. This paper analyzed the proposition that championships materially benefit the
host city and its fans.
The evidence does indicate that new stadiums do correlate with post-season play, but
only if the incremental revenues spent from the operation of a new stadium are spent on
acquiring players. It should be noted, however, that the ability of a new stadium to secure a
place in the playoffs is likely diminishing as more teams adopt this strategy. In addition there is
some evidence to indicate that there are negative costs associated with stadium construction and

the actual achievement of a championship. The preoccupation with some workers during the
championship run coupled with business disruption during formal and informal celebrations
make a championship a potentially expensive prize. Furthermore, the glow fans feel in the wake
of their ascension to the top of the sports world will quickly dissipate fairly quickly as teams
douse them with the equivalent of the contents of a Gatorade container, in the form of higher
ticket prices. Thus a warning to cities and fans, be careful what you wish for – sports
championships may come at a substantial cost.
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Table 1: New Stadiums and Team Competitiveness for MLB
Field
City
Year Opened
First Playoff
Appearance
Great American
Cincinnati
2003
PNC Park
Pittsburgh
2001
Miller Park
Milwaukee
2001
Invesco Field
Detroit
2001
Minute Maid Field
Houston
2000
2001
Pac-Bell Stadium
San Francisco
2000
2000
Safeco Park
Seattle
1999
2000
Tropicana Field
Tampa
1990/1998
Bank One Park
Phoenix
1998
1999
Turner Field
Atlanta
1996
1996
Coors Field
Denver
1995
1995
Jacobs Field
Cleveland
1994
1995
Ballpark at
Dallas/Fort Worth
1994
1996
Arlington
Camden Yards
Baltimore
1992
1995
U.S. Cellular
Chicago (AL)
1991
1992
(Comiskey)
Sky Dome
Toronto
1989
1991

Table 2: MLB Payrolls Before and After New Stadiums Built Between 1991 and 2001
Team
Payroll for
the Year the
Stadium
Opened
(Millions $)

Total Payroll
Two Years
Prior to New
Stadium
(% of Payroll
Year Stadium
Opened)

Total Payroll
One Year
Prior to New
Stadium
(% of Payroll
Year
Stadium
Opened)

Total Payroll
One Year
After New
Stadium
(% of Payroll
Year
Stadium
Opened)

Total Payroll
Two Years
After New
Stadium
(% of Payroll
Year
Stadium
Opened)

Arizona (1998)

29.16

NA

NA

Atlanta (1997)

50.49

Baltimore
(1992)
Chicago White
Sox (1991)
Cleveland
(1994)
Colorado
(1995)
Detroit (2000)

20.99

45.2
(90)
10.04
(48)
7.60
(45)
8.24
(29)
8.83
(28)
22.63
(37)
40.63
(78)
42.93
(95)
24.22
(42)
40.32
(75)
39.67
(89)
29.74
(92)

47.93
(95)
14.63
(70)
9.49
(56)
15.72
(55)
22.98
(74)
34.96
(57)
55.29
(106)
35.78
(79)
29.56
(51)
46.06
(86)
52.03
(117)
35.64
(110)

70.37
(241)
59.54
(118)
26.92
(128)
28.41
(169)
35.19
(124)
34.92
(112)
49.36
(80)
60.39
(115)
50.29
(112)
42.32
(73)
63.28
(118)
59.22
(133)
32.37
(100)

77.88
(267)
75.07
(149)
37.67
(179)
34.60
(206)
45.32
(159)
42.87
(138)
55.05
(89)
63.45
(121)
40.63
(90)
54.81
(95)
78.30
(146)
74.72
(168)
35.86
(111)

(57)

(73)

(125)

(147)

Team (Year
New Stadium
Opened)

16.83
28.49
31.15
61.74

Houston
(2000)
Milwaukee
(2001)
Pittsburgh
(2001)
San Francisco
(2000)
Seattle (1999)

44.37

Texas (1994)

32.42

Average

52.36
45.10
57.76
53.54

Source: USATODAY.com Baseball salaries database.

Table 3: The Economic Impact of the Staples Center During the Construction Phase
Quarter

Actual %

Predicted %

LA County
Taxable Sales
Less City
Taxable Sales
(millions $)

Estimated
versus
Observed
Taxable Sales
(millions $)

1998.2
1998.3
1998.4
1999.1
1999.2
1999.3

42.25
41.79
41.64
41.97
41.86
41.41

42.11
42.13
41.91
41.81
41.88
41.79

15,825
16,064
17,032
15,498
17,022
17,304

22.042
-55.781
-46.707
24.953
-3.737
-65.758

Average

-20.831

The model used to generate these results is as follows:

Equation 1
Rt = β0 + β1 Rt-1 + β2 RODNEY + β3 TIMEt + β4 TIMEt2 + εt
where for each time period t,
= the City of Los Angeles’ ratio of taxable sales to the taxable sales in
Rt
the rest of the County of Los Angeles in time period t,
RODNEY = dummy variable representing the effect of the Rodney King riots,
= linear time trend,
TIMEt
= quadratic time trend,
TIMEt2
εt
= stochastic error.

